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Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference. As long as it catches mice, it is a
good cat.
- Deng Xiaoping
He who treads softly goes far.
- Chinese proverb

I. INTRODUCTION

In a world where mergers affect every corner of the planet, any
government seeking competitive markets has an interest in ensuring
that these mergers are not harmful to competition. As China, the
world's most populous country, has committed to a market economy,1
it has now taken the momentous step of enacting its own AntiMonopoly Law ("AML"). 2 This effects a dramatic change in the
antitrust regulation of multinational mergers. In international
antitrust, even subtle legal differences between jurisdictions create
significant potential for conflict. 3 For this reason, the advent of
antitrust merger review by a country with such massive international
economic weight and historic suspicion of capitalism and market
forces generates grave concern in antitrust circles.
From an antitrust perspective, mergers are a legitimate
concern for the government of every jurisdiction in which the merging
firms previously competed. 4 As globalization accelerates, the

1.
H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly
Law of the People's Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169, 172-82 (2006).
2.
FAN LONG DUAN FA [Anti-Monopoly Law], 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG.
GAz. 517-23 (P.R.C.), available at 2008 China Law LEXIS 1761 [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008).
3.
See infra Part II.A.2.
4.
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KovAcIc & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 431-33 (2d ed. 2008).
Note that "antitrust" and "competition law" or "competition policy" are essentially synonymous
insofar as the type of law that Americans call "antitrust" is the same as the type of law most of
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geographic reach of firms expands and mergers become subject to
regulation by an increasing number of jurisdictions.5 As in any area of
law, it is unsurprising that these jurisdictions will on occasion reach
different conclusions in analyzing the same set of facts. 6 In the case of
cross-border mergers, however, one jurisdiction's disapproval can
derail a worldwide merger, even if other reviewing jurisdictions view
7
the merger as unobjectionable, or even beneficial, to competition.
Where one jurisdiction perceives the other as blocking such mergers to
further its own, non-competition-related social goals or to promote
favored domestic firms at the expense of consumers in the first
jurisdiction, this may create serious tensions between the two
jurisdictions. As globalization continues and the interests of more
jurisdictions are bound up in these mergers, the mergers face more
complex multilateral antitrust review, and the inherent risks of
international tension grow correspondingly.8
So far, these conflicts have been relatively rare. The United
States and the European Union, the two primary centers of
international merger review, maintain quite similar legal standards 9
and have agreed to collaborate in an effort to reach consistent
conclusions as frequently as possible. 10 Nonetheless, there have been
the rest of the world refers to as "competition law." As such, this Note will use the terms more or
less interchangeably.
5.
See J. WILLIAM ROWLEY & DONALD BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST
PROCESS (2d ed. 1996) (describing the statutory and regulatory schemes of twenty-nine
prominent jurisdictions); see also MAHER DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST
POLICY 14 (2003) ("Globalisation has made it almost inevitable to change antitrust law and
policy.").
6.
For instance, one jurisdiction may bar a merger on the grounds that it would mean
fewer remaining firms in the relevant market, while another may allow it because it believes
that the reduced number of firms would be more than offset, from the perspective of the
consumer, by the newly created firm's ability to produce goods and services more efficiently and
thus sell more (or better) products at a lower price. For a discussion of instances where such
conflicts have arisen, see infra Part II.A.2.
7.
This is so because many jurisdictions provide that transactions may not proceed until
they have obtained approval, and even where a transaction will be permitted to proceed, a
jurisdiction may impose fines that make the transaction prohibitively expensive. See Kyle
Robertson, Note, One Law to Control Them All: International Merger Analysis in the Wake of
GE/Honeywell, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 162-63 (2008).
8. See DABBAH, supra note 5, at 14 ("[I]t is beyond doubt that such situations give rise to
fundamental legal, economic and political problems with which the internationalisation of
antitrust is concerned.").
9.
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (U.S. standard); Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January
2004, The Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (The EC Merger Regulation), 2004
O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter EC Merger Regulation] (E.U. standard). For a comparison of the
approaches taken in each jurisdiction, see infra Part II.A.1.
10. Agreement on the Application of Their Competition Laws, U.S.-E.C., Sept. 23, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1487, 1489 [hereinafter U.S.-E.C. Competition Application Agreement]. For a discussion of
this collaborative effort, see infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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some notable disagreements between the two enforcement authorities,
which have created highly publicized transatlantic tensions. In the
wake of these clashes, commentators and regulators alike have paid
increased attention to cooperation efforts between the United States,
the European Union, and competition authorities around the world,
seeking to avoid such conflicts in the future.1 1
Now, as international antitrust convergence stands largely at
an impasse, a new complication has risen in the East. In 2008, the
12
People's Republic of China effectuated its own competition law.
Under the Anti-Monopoly Law, the world's most significant developing
country now has the legal authority to block a merger between foreign
multinational corporations even if it is deemed permissible by the
authorities of the European Union, the United States, and all other
jurisdictions involved, so long as the firms have some connection to
China. 13 Such overlapping authority has already created a history of
significant conflict between the antitrust authorities of the two
primary Western jurisdictions,1 4 which have substantial experience
with market competition, similar economic philosophies, and similar
laws. This in itself is reason to be concerned as to any new merger
review regime creating international conflict. What will happen with
China on the scene, given its very different history and philosophy?
Considering China's Communist past, its present "socialist
market economy," and its strong interest in social stability, one might
reasonably expect that its goals in competition policy will vary from
those of the United States and the European Union.1 5 The difficult
experience of these two Western regimes in multi-jurisdictional
merger review suggests that China's significantly different goals could
seriously threaten the ability of multinational corporations to merge
successfully.

11. See, e.g., Charles W. Smitherman III, The Future of Global Competition Governance:
Lessons from the Transatlantic, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 769, 772 (2004) (analyzing bilateral
cooperation efforts between the United States and European Community on competition law).
12. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2.
13. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text; see also Robertson, supra note 7, at 166
(warning that, in such situations, "[sitates, such as China, may develop competition policies that
allow for strategic blocking of foreign mergers").
14. See infra Part II.A.2.
15. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. For example, allowing mergers that
force inefficient rivals to close (with the result that workers lose their jobs) could be seen as
inconsistent with China's "socialist" goals and, from a political standpoint, the resulting
instability and unrest could be a threat to the Chinese government. From a development
standpoint, the Chinese government may want to protect local firms that are in their infancy in
hopes that they would grow into successful competitors.
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Broadly accepted economic theory posits that when mergers
create efficiencies outweighing the harm to competition, they will
create a net benefit for consumers. 16 If the purpose of antitrust law is
to protect the interests of consumers, as is generally the case in
American and European law, such mergers should be permitted. 17 On
the other hand, a legal regime based on domestic goals such as social
stability and the protection of local industry may seek to block that
same merger if, for example, it would place control of industry in
hands that the authorities find politically objectionable.1s The
question becomes: What can be done to protect the international
business community from strategic unilateral impediments to crossborder mergers and acquisitions?
Part II of this Note will describe the current global competition
context and existing proposals for achieving international convergence
and will then examine China's Anti-Monopoly Law and the risks this
law poses to the international antitrust review of mergers. Part III
will analyze proposals to minimize the risks created by Chinese
merger review. Part IV will argue that phased implementation of
merger review will create the best chance of a Chinese merger review
regime that protects and benefits Chinese consumers without creating
friction in the global economy.
To enable enforcers to gain experience in analyzing competition
issues and to help convince the public and the government that
competitive
markets
will
benefit
all
stakeholders,
AML
implementation
should begin with anti-cartel
enforcement,
elimination of local government restraints on trade, and review of
domestic mergers. This Note also predicts that the rest of the
international antitrust community will be increasingly wary of the
risk of a single competition authority's blocking of significant mergers
in a "hold-up" situation, and thus will be encouraged to move ahead
with work on international convergence through collaborative fora
such as the International Competition Network. Slightly delaying
Chinese involvement in reviewing international mergers will thus
ensure that Chinese reviewers have the experience and support they
will need to integrate smoothly into the international antitrust arena.
Similarly, their peers in that arena will be ready to welcome, guide,
and perhaps even learn from the Chinese.

16. GAVIL
17. Id.
18.

ET AL., supra note 4, at 568-70.

J. WILLIAM ROWLEY & DONALD BAKER, 1 INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST

PROCESS 3 (2d ed. 1996).
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II. BACKGROUND

To understand the implications of Chinese merger review for
global antitrust, it is instructive to examine the principles applied to
mergers by the key Western jurisdictions, the potential problems
posed by the interaction between those jurisdictions, and the proposed
solutions to those concerns. In Part II.A, a description of the pre-AML
international antitrust context sets the scene, while Parts II.B and
II.C introduce China's Anti-Monopoly Law and outline the core
concerns arising from Chinese regulators reviewing international
mergers.
A. The InternationalAntitrust Merger Review World before China
The increasing globalization and development of the past two
decades have triggered corresponding growth in the scope and
importance of global competition policy. First, the number and size of
businesses conducting activities across borders has increased
exponentially. 19 As these corporations grow beyond the borders of
their nations, more jurisdictions have an interest in regulating the
competition that results. 20 Second, as market economies develop
around the world, governments see the need for laws that ensure that
competition functions properly, delivering the promised benefits of the
free market to consumers. This has led to the number of jurisdictions
with competition laws ballooning from thirty-five to over one hundred
between 1995 and 2003.21
Although a merger between large multinational corporations
would be subject to regulation in many different jurisdictions, until
recently the most significant reviewing bodies have generally been
those of the United States and the European Union. Two reasons
explain their primacy: (1) these are two of the largest markets in the
world, where many corporations are based or conduct business; and (2)
they have very well-developed competition law and theory, to which
most other jurisdictions look for guidance. 22 Thus, this Part will
compare the merger analyses conducted by European and American
antitrust authorities before examining the interaction between the
two jurisdictions and then introducing the international-level
19. CHARLES SMITHERMAN, TRANSATLANTIC MERGER CASES: UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY MERGER REVIEW CO-OPERATION 7 (2007).

20. Id. at 14-15.
21. Michael W. Nicholson, An Antitrust Law Index For Empirical Analysis of International
Competition Policy, 4 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1009, 1009 (2008).

22.

ROWLEY & BAKER, supra note 18, at 4.
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proposals to minimize conflict and costs associated with the manifold
review of cross-border mergers. This context will help to understand
and address concerns about China's law, introduced in Parts II.B and
II.C.
1. Comparing American and European Merger Analyses
In terms of both the substantive standards by which mergers
are judged and the procedural mechanisms for regulating mergers, the
United States and Europe have, on the whole, quite similar systems of
antitrust merger review. In the United States, most mergers are
reviewed under the standard provided in Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 23 The Clayton Act prohibits mergers that "may ... substantially.
.. lessen competition, or... tend to create a monopoly." 24 Because the
substantive standard of "substantially ... lessen competition" is far
from self-explanatory, the two authorities that split responsibility for
competition regulation in the United States 25 have issued Horizontal
Merger Guidelines to direct the analysis of mergers between firms
that compete in the same market, the context in which there is
greatest risk of harm to competition. 26 These Guidelines are discussed
in detail and compared with the European equivalent below.
In Europe, the EC Merger Regulation, adopted by the
European Commission in 1989 and amended significantly in 2004,
provides the standard for competition law review of mergers.27
Mergers that meet certain Community-wide turnover thresholds 28 are

23. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). They may also be challenged under the Sherman Act, as Section 1
agreements in restraint of trade, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), as Section 2 monopolization or attempts to
monopolize, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006), or under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
Act as an "unfair method of competition," 15 U.S.C § 45 (2006).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 18. One significant aspect of this language is the use of the word "may,"
which provides a basis for challenging mergers before consummation on the probabilitythat they
will have anticompetitive effects. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 432.
25. These two agencies are the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
('"DOJ").
26. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(1992),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horizbook/hmgl.html
[hereinafter DOJ/FTC Guidelines].
27. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 9. The key source of all competition law is the Treaty
of Rome. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3.
Articles 81 and 82 prohibit agreements that restrict competition, Id. art. 81, and the abuse of a
dominant position, Id. art. 82, respectively. The Merger Regulation was enacted because these
Articles did not, themselves, give authority to block anti-competitive mergers. EC Merger
Regulation, supra note 9, pmbl. 7.
28. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 9, art. 1. Note that the EC Merger Regulation uses
the term "concentration" to mean a change of control resulting from merger or acquisition. Id.
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prohibited if they "would significantly impede effective competition, in
the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a
result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position." 29 Like
the American agencies, the European Commission has issued Merger
Guidelines to direct this analysis.3 0 As discussed below, the similarity
goes beyond the basic phrasing of the standards. There is also strong
agreement between the American and European competition regimes
on the elements of merger analysis, though not yet enough to
eliminate all potential for tension.
First, the Guidelines promulgated in both jurisdictions set
forth similar substantive analytical steps and considerations to
determine when a proposed merger would be anticompetitive. Of the
five-step analysis provided for in the DOJ/FTC Guidelines, all five
steps are also incorporated in a very similar form in the European
Guidelines. These steps are (1) defining the relevant market and
measuring concentration in that market before and after the merger;
(2) assessing the potential adverse competitive effects of the merger on
the relevant market; (3) analyzing the possibility of other suppliers
entering the market to compete with the merged firm; (4) evaluating
the efficiencies created by the merger; and (5) determining whether
one of the firms would be likely to fail, and its assets to exit the
market, unless the firms merge. 31 At first glance, the notable
difference between the two sets of Guidelines is that the European
analysis also considers "countervailing buyer power." 32 However, this
difference has little significance, as buyer power is also incorporated
in the American analysis as part of the assessment of potential
anticompetitive effects. 33 Another significant common thread between
the American and European analyses lies in what the authorities do
not consider, either in their respective Guidelines or in the actual
art. 3. For consistency and clarity, this Note will generally use the term "merger" to denote all
such transactions.
29. Id. art. 2, 3.
30. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on
the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 3 [hereinafter EC
Guidelines].
31. DOJ/FTC Guidelines, supra note 26, §§ 1-5; EC Guidelines, supra note 30,
14-63,
68-91.
32. EC Guidelines, supranote 30,
64-67.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that customer sophistication "was likely to promote competition even in a highly
concentrated market"); FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.)
("A concentrated and knowledgeable buying side makes collusion by sellers more difficult."); see
also DOJ/FTC Guidelines, supra note 26, § 2.1 (listing "the characteristics of buyers" among
factors relevant to assessment of the risk of coordinated anticompetitive behavior in the postmerger market).
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analysis of mergers: broader issues such as the effect of mergers on
overall economic development or on competing suppliers are not part
34
of either jurisdiction's antitrust merger analysis.
Second, both regimes incorporate a notification system for
transactions above a certain threshold. In order to ensure that
American enforcement authorities have the procedural ability to
review proposed mergers and, if necessary, to stop them before they
are consummated, Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act in 1976. 35 The Act requires that firms report all
acquisitions above certain thresholds based on the size of the
transaction and the sizes of the parties. 36 Transactions without a
37
strong connection to the United States are exempt from filing.
Similarly, the EC Merger Regulation requires parties to notify the
Commission prior to consummation of a proposed merger 38 if the
merger exceeds thresholds based on turnover worldwide and within
39
the European Community.
Finally, both regimes allow the respective enforcing agency to
block undesirable mergers, though they have slightly differing
mechanisms for doing so. In both systems, parties to a merger that
exceeds the relevant thresholds are prohibited from implementing
their transaction until the authorities have approved it or the waiting
period has expired. 40 In the United States, however, the investigating
agency 41 cannot directly block the acquisition; rather, the agency must
sue in court for a preliminary injunction. 42 Thus, even if the agency
believes that, under the DOJ/FTC Guidelines, a proposed merger
34. For more on this point, see infra Parts II.B and 1.C.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006).
36. Id. § 18a(a)(2). These thresholds are commonly referred to as "notification thresholds,"
and the filings in the United States are commonly referred to as "HSR filings." These thresholds
are indexed for inflation: as of 2009, for instance, all transactions valued above $260.7 million
must be reported regardless of the size of the parties. Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for
Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 1687 (Jan. 13, 2009) (also covering smaller
acquisitions where the firms have significant assets and sales).
37. 16 C.F.R. § 802.50(a) (as adjusted by Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of
the Clayton Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 1687) (exempting, for example, acquisitions of stock in a foreign
company that generates less than $65.2 million in annual sales within the United States).
38. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4.
39. Id. (referring to Article 1 definition of "Community dimension"). The relevant term,
"aggregate turnover", is defined as revenue net of value added tax. Id. art. 5, 1.
40. Id. art. 7, 1; 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a). This means the transaction may not proceed until (a)
thirty days pass, (b) the deal is approved, or (c) a second request is issued and either (i) another
thirty days pass or (ii) the deal is approved. Id. § 18a(b)(1), (e).
41. The investigating agency may be either the FTC or the DOJ; the agencies agree on
which will investigate, or whether to grant early termination of the investigation, shortly after
being notified of the proposed transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2).

42. Id. § 18a(f).
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would lessen competition, the merger may proceed unless the agency
successfully convinces a court that it would actually do so. The
European Commission, on the other hand, has the unilateral power to
block a merger that it concludes would "significantly impede effective
competition." 43 Decisions of the Commission may then be appealed to
the European Court of Justice. 44 Also unlike the American procedure,
third-party complainants may appeal a decision by the Commission
not to challenge a merger. 45 The fact that the Commission does not
need judicial approval to block a merger, but is subject to judicial
review for failing to block a merger, means that the Commission is at
least marginally more likely to challenge mergers than the American
agencies.
While the European legal standards and procedures for merger
review are fairly analogous to those of the United States, the two
jurisdictions have not reached identical conclusions in all mergers.
The occasional divergences and tensions discussed below hint at the
risks confronting the antitrust community and international business
as China, with its somewhat dissimilar standards, joins the more
established jurisdictions in reviewing cross-border mergers.
2. Transatlantic Antitrust Interaction and Global Concerns
The relatively similar horizontal merger guidelines published
by the United States and European Union reflect a common
intellectual vision that is the result of an extensive convergence
process. 46 This convergence effort began in 1991 with an agreement to
exchange information on enforcement activities and to cooperate and
coordinate their activities in order to minimize conflict in antitrust
enforcement. 47 The 1991
Agreement indicated transatlantic
acknowledgement of the potential for conflict in the increasingly
prevalent transactions that implicate both jurisdictions. 48 The Best
43.

EC Merger Regulation, supranote 9, art. 8,

3.

44. Id. art. 16.
45. See Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Ass'n v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. II02289 (Court of First Instance criticizing a Commission decision declining to challenge a merger
and ordering the Commission to undertake further review of the transaction). On the other hand,
the only option for third parties in the United States who are injured by agency inaction in such
a case would be to bring their own suit challenging the merger. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006)
(providing for injunctive relief for private parties, under the Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)
(same, under the Sherman Act).
46. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
47. U.S.-E.C. Competition Application Agreement, supra note 10.
48. Id. pmbl. (stating that "the world's economies are becoming increasingly interrelated,"
that "the sound and effective enforcement of the Parties' competition laws would be enhanced by
cooperation," and that "from time to time differences may arise ... concerning the application of
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Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations recently adopted by
the American antitrust agencies and the European Commission also
play a significant role in bilateral convergence. 49 Though non-binding,
the Best Practices recognize the risks of divergent approaches to
mergers 50 and set forth practices that the agencies seek to apply when
51
reviewing the same merger.
Despite these efforts, there remain some significant differences
between the merger analyses of the United States and the European
Union that have occasionally led to notable conflict. For example, as
mentioned above, the nature of review in the two jurisdictions means
that U.S. agencies likely are more disposed to decline to challenge
mergers because they can accept defendants' efficiency arguments
that may be difficult to quantify, whereas the Commission would only
accept such arguments if it thought they would withstand appellate
review. 52 Relatively subtle procedural differences like this may
contribute to the occasional divergence in conclusions that the two
bodies reach.
The Boeing / McDonnell Douglas and the General Electric !
Honeywell mergers, a pair of transactions that were each addressed
by both the American and European authorities, highlight both the
differences between the two regimes and the risks of such divergences.
In 1997, Boeing sought to acquire McDonnell Douglas. Neither firm
was engaged in production within the European Community, though
both sold aircraft to European customers. 53 The FTC had already
decided to permit the merger. 54 Nonetheless, the European

their competition laws."). The United States and the European Union subsequently entered into
another agreement that provided guidelines for requests for positive comity. Agreement on the
Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, U.S.E.C., June 4, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1070.
49. See Press Release, U.S.-E.U. Merger Working Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in
Merger Investigations (Oct. 30, 2002), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/
docs/200405.pdf.
50. Id.
1 (acknowledging that divergent approaches "undermine public confidence in the
merger review process, risk imposing inconsistent requirements on the firms involved, and may
frustrate the agencies' respective remedial objectives").
51. Id.
4 (providing for practices such as scheduled communication between agencies at
key points in their investigations).
52. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
53. See Vago Muradian, Europe Rejects Boeing-MDC Merger, White House Mulls Response,
DEFENSE DAiLY, July 17, 1997 (quoting an analyst as observing that "[e]ssentially, a foreign
government is attempting to dictate to two American companies whether [they] can form a more
efficient business combination").
54. See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger,
Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A. Varney in the Matter of The Boeing Company/McDonnell
Corporation (June 25, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07[boeingsta.shtm
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Commission opposed the deal as originally proposed, creating a very
public dispute between ministers and heads of government. 5 The
Commission ultimately obtained a settlement that required Boeing to
modify its exclusive contracts with three major airlines, and the
tension dissipated as the firms merged under the terms of the
56
settlement.
The next significant transatlantic conflict arose in 2001 when
General Electric sought to acquire Honeywell. This time, the DOJ
cleared the merger while the European Commission prohibited it
altogether. 57 The conflicting decisions of the DOJ and Commission
were followed by further heated statements, this time from the DOJ's
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, who accused the
Commission of blocking the merger because the resulting American
firm would be too efficient. 58 The divergent conclusions apparently
resulted from the European Union's concern that the merged firm
would be able to obtain a dominant position in the market for some
aircraft components by bundling Honeywell and General Electric
products. 59 Although the different results arose from apparently
legitimate differences over economic antitrust theory, 60 the
(reasoning that McDonnell Douglas was no longer a meaningful competitive force and that a
merger would not lessen competition).
55. See Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives Regarding the
Interference of the European Commission in the Merger of the Boeing Company and McDonnell
Douglas, H.R. Res. 191, 105th Cong. (1997) (stating that the Commission was "determined to
disapprove the merger to gain an unfair competitive advantage for Airbus Industries" and that
blocking the merger "would constitute an unwarranted and unprecedented interference in a
United States business transaction ....
"); Michael Harrison, Clinton Warns of Boeing Trade
War, INDEPENDENT (London), July 18, 1997, at 22 (quoting President Clinton who stated:
"There's an orderly process for our handling this and I think we'd better let the orderly process
play itself out before we talk ourselves into a trade war."); Steven Pearlstein & Anne Swardson,
U.S. Gets Tough to Ensure Boeing, McDonnell Merger; Retaliation Plan in Works as Europe
Threatens, WASH. POST, July 17, 1997, at C1 (discussing negotiations between Clinton
administration representatives and the European Union's commissioner for competition); see also
Kathleen Luz, Note, The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger: Competition Law, Parochialism,
and the Need for a Globalized Antitrust System, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 155, 158,
170-71 (1999) (analyzing the heated debate between the Clinton administration and European
officials concerning the merger).
56. Case IV/M.877, Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16.
57. The Commission's decision was affirmed by the European Union's Court of First
Instance. Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-05575.
58. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney Gen. Charles A.
James on the EU's Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition (July 3, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/20O1/July/303at.htm.
59. See Thomas L. Ruffner, The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger: The Return of PortfolioEffects Theory?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1285-87 (2003) (describing differences in United States
and European enforcement policies in relation to GE/Honeywell merger).
60. Specifically, the dispute centered on whether "portfolio effects" of the conglomerate
merger would adversely affect the market. See Pinar Karacan, Differences in Merger Analysis
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accusations of parochialism indicate the high potential for tension in
cases where jurisdictions may have conflicting national economic
interests. 61 Situations such as these, where it appears that one
country has blocked a merger with pro-competitive benefits for
consumers around the world solely because the merger would make it
more difficult for a favored domestic firm to compete, illustrate the
parochialism that commentators often cite as a core concern in
international merger review.
As increasingly more jurisdictions are involved in the review of
transnational mergers, the risk of interference with competitively
beneficial mergers becomes ever greater. If the potential for
parochialism is a risk when there are two jurisdictions involved, it will
certainly be a weightier concern when fifteen sets of regulators take
part. The threat of such parochialism interfering with mergers that
create real economic benefits for consumers around the world is a
significant impetus for reform to the international antitrust system.
The first goal of this reform would be to prevent national agencies
from acting on parochial concerns and blocking mergers that create
62
net benefits for the entire globe.
In addition to this risk of non-consummation, the costs of
effecting mergers are becoming increasingly burdensome even in cases
where no jurisdiction is troubled. For instance, a 2003 study
commissioned by the International Bar Association found that the
typical international merger generates an average of €3.3 million
($4.24 million) in merger review costs. 63 These procedural costs to
Between the United States and the European Union, Highlighted in the Context of the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell Mergers, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 209, 235-39
(2004); Ruffner, supra note 59, at 1325.
61. See Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of
Merger Control, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 457, 467 (2002) (observing that "the conflict of
interest erodes the grounds for trust"). For example, in the Boeing case, the United States
arguably had an interest in an American company becoming more competitive, both because the
government would receive more tax revenue and the domestic economy would benefit, in addition
to having been lobbied by Boeing in favor of allowing the merger. On the other hand, the
European Union had an interest in protecting Airbus's competitive position as a rival to Boeing,
especially given the significant support the company receives from European governments.
62. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for InternationalAntitrust, in COMPETITION LAWS IN
CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 99, 101 (Richard A. Epstein &

Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (arguing that domestic antitrust regimes exhibit parochial bias,
which includes favoritism towards domestic corporations); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Toward
World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 n.4 (1997) [hereinafter Fox, Toward
World Antitrust] ("Parochialismconnotes discrimination against and barriers to foreign goods or
services.").
63. Press Release, Int'l Bar Ass'n, IBA/ABA Survey Identifies Costs to Bus. of Competition
Referrals on Cross-Border M&A Deals (June 23, 2003), available at http://www.ibanet.
org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=7a8abb4-4da0-4f31-b606-86c2 lb21la49.
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parties and regulators alike have fueled the desire for an international
antitrust regime that both reviews mergers more efficiently and
reduces the uncertainty facing parties across jurisdictions. The next
Part will examine the various proposals for international antitrust
that achieve the goals of preventing parochial blocking and reducing
the costs of antitrust review.
3. Avenues to International Convergence
The occasional conflict and consternation between the world's
leading antitrust authorities, combined with the ever-growing number
of antitrust systems around the world, have spawned a variety of
proposals on how to accomplish convergence and minimize procedural
burdens on business. Some of these proposals, such as creating a
supranational antitrust agency, are likely too high-minded and
ambitious to have much hope for success in the real world in the
foreseeable future. However, more modest proposals involving fairly
informal discussion and cooperation have already shown some success
and have great potential to minimize the costs and risks facing crossborder mergers. This Part discusses the primary proposed solutions to
the problems facing international antitrust and assesses the probable
64
efficacy of each such proposal.
a. SupranationalAntitrust Enforcement
The most drastic proposed overhaul of the international merger
review system calls for a supranational antitrust enforcement agency
to be charged with the task of reviewing cross-border mergers. 65 The
underlying premise for such a proposal is fairly simple: in order for an
antitrust enforcement agency to assess and regulate business conduct
effectively, it ought to operate at the same level as the businesses
involved.6 6 In the case of cross-border mergers, the transaction
necessarily affects a geographic market that is broader than any one
nation. Proponents argue that relocating merger review to this same
level would (1) eliminate the burdens of reporting to multiple agencies
64. The proposals are discussed, roughly, in descending order of the degree to which nations
would have to cede control over their domestic competition policy.
65. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Scott H. Angstreich, MultinationalMerger Review: Lessons
From Our Federalism, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 222 (2000) (discussing the possibility of
supranational review); Karel Van Miert, The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to
Consider Negotiations, Address Before Ambassadors to the WTO (Apr. 21, 1998),
http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/speeches/text/sp1998-038_-en.html (advocating the establishment
of "a multilateral framework of competition rules").
66. Ginsburg & Angstreich, supranote 65, at 222.
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and facing conflicting remedies from each,6 7 (2) create an agency that
68
can consider competitive impact across the entire geographic market,
and (3) take advantage of any possible economies of scale in merger
69
review.
However, it is not clear that supranational enforcement is
either possible or even desirable in practice. Arguably the largest
obstacle to supranational merger review is that countries would be
hesitant to relinquish control over mergers. Because national
antitrust authorities and governments derive significant benefits from
merger regulation, they are likely to resist such a reform. 70 Another
problem is that a rigidly unified international competition law would
halt the evolution of competition law, as it would remove pressure
created by "competition of competition laws." 71 Further, because a
merger would be anti-competitive in one country, thereby inevitably
leading that country to pressure the supranational agency to block the
72
merger, such an agency might not in fact make the "globally optimal"
73
decisions aspired to under this plan.
Even if countries agreed to surrender authority over
international mergers to a supranational enforcement agency-an
occurrence that appears highly unlikely-implementation would be
difficult, and political pressures in practice would prevent realization
of the most significant theoretical gains. The real-world ills of
parochialism and transaction costs require a more pragmatic cure.

67. These problems would necessarily not apply where there is only one global regulator.
68. Ginsburg & Angstreich, supra note 65, at 222.
69. Id. at 223.
70. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT 130
(2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm [hereinafter ICPAC Report]
(recognizing the potential conflict of interest from using filing fees to fund a substantial part of
agency operation, beyond the specific merger); Ginsburg & Angstreich, supra note 65, at 226
(citing the significant share of agency revenues received from merger notification fees,
particularly by the American agencies, and agencies requiring divestitures be directed to
domestic buyers).
71. Karl M. Meessen, Competition of Competition Laws, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 17, 21
(1989). So long as there are nations implementing a range of competition laws, they will be able
to learn, empirically, which of those laws actually augment competition and improve economies,
and which ones do not. Id. at 18.
72. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501,
1512 (1998) [hereinafter Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible (stating that when
analyzing international mergers, "[t]he optimal policy is the one that allows all activities for
which the global change in profits plus the global change in consumer surplus is positive").
73. See Ginsburg & Angstreich, supra note 65, at 226 ("[Ilf a merger that is procompetitive
overall is thought likely to have anticompetitive effects in a certain country, that country could
not be expected to yield jurisdiction over the merger.").
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b. Use of Binding InternationalCodes or Treaties
Another ambitious proposal is the development of an
international competition code, which could involve either an
international enforcement agency or enforcement by the individual
states in accordance with the code. A notable example of such a
proposal was drafted by the International Antitrust Code Working
Group, which created a draft International Antitrust Code (commonly
74
known as the Munich Code).
The Munich Code was a highly articulated antitrust treaty that
called for an International Antitrust Authority to be created by the
signatory countries within the institutional framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 75 Under this plan, the
international code would effectively replace the antitrust laws of each
signatory state.7 6 This approach would have the advantage of
uniformity and clarity: businesses would have one worldwide set of
clear rules with which to comply.7 7 The problems posed by conflicting
national antitrust rules would be remedied as nations adopted the
uniform international code.
In reality, however, even those nations that agree on the broad
principles of competition law would be unlikely to reach an agreement
on the details involved in such a code.7 8 Furthermore, states would
almost certainly hesitate to surrender their sovereignty over an area
of law with such potential for domestic economic significance. 79 And
even if such a system were developed, there would still be a
substantial danger of high-profile disputes and international tension
in cases where one country sees potential for competitive harm in its
own markets, but others do not.80 In sum, although an international

74. Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement,
reprinted in 25 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. S-1 (Aug. 19, 1993) (BNA) [hereinafter Munich
Code].
75. See id. art. 19.
76. See id. art. 2, § 1(a). Member states would be required to either directly transform the
Munich Code into domestic law, or to change domestic laws to bring them into conformity with
the Code. Id. art. 2, cmt. 1. The International Antitrust Authority would have the power to sue
national authorities that fail to meet their obligation under the Code, id. art. 19, § 2(e), with an
International Antitrust Panel to resolve disputes over implementation. Id. art. 20, § 2.
77. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of
Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 11 (1995).
78. Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra note 62, at 16.

79. Id. at 18.
80. See Ginsburg & Angstreich, supra note 65, at 226 ("[I]f a merger that is procompetitive
overall is thought likely to have anticompetitive effects in a certain country, that country could
not be expected to yield jurisdiction over the merger."); see also Guzman, Is International
Antitrust Possible?, supra note 72, at 1512-15 (describing "a two-country model in which one
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antitrust code would theoretically be an effective tool, it is unlikely
81
that such a code could be successfully implemented.
c. Use of BilateralArrangements
The easiest of the existing proposals to implement, and one
that has been used fairly extensively in practice, is the negotiation of
bilateral agreements on antitrust enforcement.8 2 These formal
agreements between a pair of jurisdictions include measures such as
notification and information exchanges, communication, and
cooperation amongst national enforcement officials.8 3 As bilateral
agreements are relatively easy to develop and can improve
competition law enforcement, particularly where the agencies interact
84
regularly, some scholars argue they are the most effective solution.
Indeed, such agreements have achieved considerable success in
facilitating convergence and increasing efficiency in the review of
85
cross-border mergers.
Nonetheless, as even the most prominent supporters of
bilateral agreements recognize, 6 they do not eliminate the potential
for significant disagreements between nations.8 7 A merger that would
be pro-competitive in one jurisdiction but is perceived as having anticompetitive effects in the other will likely be blocked, even where the
net outcome of the merger, on a global scale, would be procompetitive.88 Furthermore, the sheer number of jurisdictions with
some form of merger review and control mechanisms limits the
helpfulness of bilateral agreements. Today, more than one hundred
country is home to exporters of imperfectly produced goods but not to importers of those goods
and the other country is home to importers and not exporters").
81. Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 277, 278 n.4 (1992).

82. E.g., U.S.-E.C. Competition Application Agreement, supra note 10 (bilateral agreement
between the United States and the European Communities).
83. Id. arts. II-IV.
84. See Smitherman, supra note 11, at 857 ("Bilateral cooperation coupled with the creation
and strengthening of regulatory networks represents the most effective means available for
competition law regulation and enforcement in the present globalization era.").
85. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the
Application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the
United States of America regardingthe Application of their Competition Laws, at 9, COM (2000)
618 final (Oct. 4, 2000).
86. Smitherman, supranote 11, at 814.
87. See supra Part II.A.2.
88. See DABBAH, supra note 5, at 229 (noting how international organizations, such as
WTO, have advocated "shifting the focus of domestic antitrust authorities from national to global
welfare and efficiencies); see also Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, supra note 72, at
1512-15.

1594

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:5:1577

countries have competition laws.8 9 Negotiation of a series of bilateral
agreements between each competition regime would be extremely
difficult and lengthy, but variance among the many resulting
agreements would still impose significant costs on business. In sum,
bilateral agreements present a good starting point towards
competition enforcement that maximizes efficiency and minimizes
costs, but they fall significantly short of achieving a globally optimal
outcome that
minimizes
transaction
costs
and
divergent
determinations.
d. MultilateralArrangements and Networks
Possibly the most promising, and currently the most successful,
approach to international convergence on antitrust enforcement
involves "soft law" convergence through multilateral networks. 90 This
approach is based on the "recognition that countries may be prepared
to cooperate in meaningful ways but are not necessarily prepared to be
legally bound under international law." 91 The primary forum for this
92
convergence today is the International Competition Network ("ICN").
The ICN does not attempt "top-down" harmonization; it is
based instead upon experimentation by member agencies, enabling
other agencies to adopt practices that appear effective. 93 Significantly,
developing-world agencies play a substantial role in the ICN, helping
set the agenda and participating in norm-creation.9 4 In an effort to
89. Nicholson, supra note 21, at 1009.
90. D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of
InternationalAntitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37, 97 (2007). By "soft law,"
Sokol means that this mechanism involves convergence through non-binding consensus and
recommended practices.
91. ICPAC Report, supranote 70, at 284.
92. International Competition Network, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org
(last visited Sept. 11, 2009). The ICN was launched in 2001 by top officials from fourteen
jurisdictions, including the United States and European Union, following the recommendations
of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, created by the DOJ to address
global antitrust problems, especially multi-jurisdictional merger review. ICPAC Report, supra
note 70, at 281.
93.

INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, A STATEMENT OF MISSION & ACHIEVEMENTS UP UNTIL

MAY 2005 2 (2005). Contrary to the international response to many such non-binding
recommendations in other fields, many agencies have already begun to adopt the best and
recommended practices published by the ICN. As of 2005, fifty-four percent of member agencies
had made changes to their merger review regimes to comply with the recommended practices.
Sokol, supra note 90, at 113. Another indicia of success lies in the ICN's rapid growth: its
meetings now involve delegates from over ninety national antitrust agencies. Dina Kallay,
Counsel for I.P. and Int'l Antitrust, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at Melbourne Law
School's "Unleashing the Tiger? Competition Law in China and Hong Kong" Conference (Oct. 4,
2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/oia/speeches/OS1OO4kallaymelbourne.pdf.
94. Sokol, supra note 90, at 106.
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encourage a Chinese merger regime that is in line with these
international norms, many of ICN's recommended practices were
presented to the Chinese government as it drafted the AML, as
discussed below. 95 Multilateral soft law convergence has proven, thus
far, to be the most effective international mechanism in addressing
the problems of multi-jurisdictional review. A significant strength of
the ICN has been the inclusion of developing agencies, giving them a
voice in norm creation and thereby augmenting the perceived
legitimacy of the recommendations and making developing countries
more amenable to including them in their own practices. 96 Indeed, if
Chinese antitrust officials were to participate in the norm creation
process, it could significantly strengthen the ICN's future
international convergence efforts. In addition to the inherent value of
adding China's input into the process, the prospect of diminishing the
likelihood of parochialism in Chinese merger review will give agencies
from the United States and European Union a strong incentive to
increase their own convergence efforts.
The proposals outlined in this Part all share the fact that their
ability to create an efficient system for the analysis of international
mergers in the future depends crucially on China. No international
convergence can remedy the concerns created by the addition of China
to the multi-jurisdictional merger review arena unless China is
included in the discussion. This will require that the international
community proceed with efforts wherein China would be able to
contribute to the process rather than be force-fed foreign ideas. It will
also depend on how China applies the AML and participates in the
international antitrust community. To get a sense of what to expect
from China, this Note next will examine the background and
substance of the AML.
B. Enter the Dragon?:An Introductionto China'sAnti-Monopoly Law
China's interest in economic liberalization and competitive
markets has its roots in the rule of Deng Xiaoping. A few years after
his rise to power, serious discussion began in China about enacting a
competition law. 97 The primary impetus for the enactment of a
comprehensive competition law, however, was China's need to re-tool
its economic policies in connection with its 2002 accession to the

95. See infra Part III.A.
96. Sokol, supra note 90, at 114.
97. Harris, supra note 1, at 172-74. Deng gained power in 1978, and discussions of enacting
a competition law started in the mid-1980s. Id. at 174.
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WTO. 9 8 In 2003, China promulgated several draft rules, including
rules on mergers involving foreign multinationals, and enacted
Provisional Merger and Acquisitions Rules.9 9 Within the year,
however, Chinese officials had acknowledged that they would "simply
not enforce an antitrust review when approving M&A transactions."' 10 0
Thus, prior to 2008, China was not generally involved in the review of
transnational mergers.
In April 2005, China circulated a draft AML to Chinese and
foreign antitrust experts for comment, a process which helped Chinese
drafters incorporate foreign experience into several subsequent drafts
and ultimately to the final law. 10 1 In August 2007, China passed the
AML, which went into effect on August 1, 2008.102 The AML prohibits,
in the mergers and acquisitions context, "consolidation which has or
may have the effect of eliminating or restricting market
competition."10 3 Consistent with the Western approach of permitting
transactions when efficiencies outweigh anticompetitive effects, the
AML permits mergers when "the positive effect on competition is
greater than the negative effect." 104 The factors to be considered in
merger analysis include: (1) market share and ability to control the
market, (2) market concentration, (3) the effect on market entry and
technological advance, (4) the effect on consumers and competitors, (5)
98. Id. at 176-77.
99. See Client Alert, Latham & Watkins, Acquisitions of Non-Listed Domestic Enterprises in
the People's Republic of China, (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.lw.com/Resources.
aspx?page=CientAertdetai&pageNum=75&pubication=98&searchtype=ClientAlert%2C+New
sletters.
100. Harris, supra note 1, at 178 n.45 (citing Shu-Ching Jean Chen, China Quietly Scraps
M&A Review, DAILY DEAL, July 15, 2003).
101. Compare Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China Draft for Comment,
(Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/AntitrustTrade-Law-Section/Antitrust
/DevCompLaw-PRC.aspx, with Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2. See also Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China Draft for Comment, (July 27, 2005), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/AntitrustTradeLawSection/AntitrustlDevCompLawPRC.aspx.
For discussion of ongoing interaction concerning the AML, see infra note 139.
102. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2.
103. Id. art. 3. The only immediately apparent difference between this and the American and
European language is that it lacks the word "substantially" or "significantly." See 15 U.S.C. § 18
(barring mergers that "may ... substantially . . . lessen competition"); EC Merger Regulation,

supra note 9, art. 2, § 2 (barring mergers that "would significantly impede effective competition").
Indeed, the ABA recommended the incorporation of such a term during the drafting process;
however, the term was not included in the final version. Joint Submission of the American Bar
Association's Sections of Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property Law and International Law on the
Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (2005), at 24, available at
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/businessregulation/antitrust/chinacommentsantimono
poly.pdf [hereinafter ABA Comments].
104. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 28. This probably means that the impact of the
slight difference in language, supranote 103, is minimal.
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the effect on national economic development, and (6) any other factors
deemed "worth consideration." 10 5
Although these factors are not entirely dissimilar from those
seen in the American and European merger guidelines, there are some
notable differences. Whereas the American and European analysis is
quite narrowly focused on the competitive impact within the relevant
market, the AML provides for a broader inquiry. The inclusion of
factors like effect on national economic development, technological
advance, and other competitors is evidence that the Chinese intend
their law to have a significantly different focus than those of either the
Americans or the Europeans. Incorporation of these considerations
may provide an avenue for furthering the more "parochial" goals of
increasing domestic production and avoiding plant closings, as
opposed to focusing on protecting consumer welfare.
This uniqueness is to be expected: the AML is different because
China is different. China is constitutionally committed to being a
"socialist market economy." 10 6 Central planning has long been part of
Chinese culture, viewed as the primary route to economic goals. 10 7 For
China, law is a tool for achieving social goals.1 08 In an area of law that
largely relates to the "private economy," but that also has significant
public implications, it is natural for China to incorporate
considerations beyond impact on market competition.1 0 9 China's
history, goals, and current issues are all very different from those of
the United States and the European Union. China is a developing
economy, and its government simultaneously needs to encourage
private sector competition, address public sector interference, and
manage the economy's development. Even experienced Western
experts do not know what form of competition law is ideal in such a

105. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 27. For comparison, see supra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text, which discuss the factors considered in American and European analysis.
106. XIAN FA [Constitution], pmbl. T 7, (P.R.C.), available at 2004 China Law LEXIS 6033
("[T]he peoples of China will continue to ... develop the socialist market economy."); id. art. 15
("The state implements a socialist market economy.").
107. Ignacio De Le6n, Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: Institutional Analysis of Competition
Policy in Transition and Developing Countries: The Lessons from Latin America, 3 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 405, 421-22 (2004).
108. Ignazio Castelluci, Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics,13 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 35, 46 (2007) (observing that "[p]olitical considerations ... play a major role in case-bycase judicial or administrative interpretation and enforcement" in China).
109. Id. at 85, 88 (identifying competition law as an area in which "stricter legality principles
will probably have wider application," due to its relation to improving market functionality, but
also one where policy considerations will continue to have an impact).
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situation. 110 The substantive concerns arising from this breadth of
issues to be addressed are discussed below in Part II.C.
The procedure for review outlined in the AML bears strong
similarities to those of the United States and the European Union.
When a proposed merger is above certain thresholds, the parties must
report their proposed transaction to the Ministry of Commerce.11 1
After reporting, there is a thirty-day waiting period, during which the
authorities can either decide to investigate further or clear the
transaction. 112 As in the European Union, the authorities have the
power to prohibit a merger directly, without judicial approval, when
the merger would restrict or eliminate competition.1 13 Like both the
United States and European Union, Chinese authorities can approve
mergers subject to restrictive conditions, as the European Union did
with Boeing, 114 and China has in fact already done so in a pair of
115
mergers.
To summarize, the AML imposes a substantive standard for
the approval of mergers that is at least superficially similar to those of
the United States and European Union: mergers must not "ha[ve] the
effect of eliminating or restricting market competition."' 1 6 The
procedural requirements are also quite similar: parties to mergers
above certain thresholds of business volume must report their
intended transaction to the authorities and then wait for a given
period of time, or until given approval, before consummating the
transaction. The greatest potential for conflict is, predictably, in the
details. The factors considered in determining whether a merger
would eliminate or restrict competition include some that are not
110. See Ginsburg & Angstreich, supranote 65, at 224 ("We do not know, and we doubt that
anyone knows at this early stage, how to deal with the peculiar issues that are likely to arise
with mergers in a country that is still in transition from socialism to capitalism .... ); see also
Diane P. Wood, InternationalHarmonization of Antitrust: The Tortoise or the Hare, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 391, 405-06 (2002) (discussing the need for different competition laws in transition
economies).
111. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 21; see also Circular of the Legislative Affairs
Office of the State Council Requesting the Public Soliciation of Comments on Provisions of the
State Council on the Declaration of the Concentration of Business Operators (Draft for
Comment) art. 3 (Aug. 1, 2008), available at 2008 China Law LEXIS 1919 (proposing thresholds,
similar to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and EC Merger Regulation, above which mergers must be
reported).
112. Anti-Monopoly Law, supranote 2, art. 25.
113. Id. art. 28.
114. Id. art. 29. Such approval is essentially a settlement between the regulators and the
merging parties.
115. Li Jing, MOFCOM Approves InBev, AB Merger, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 19, 2008, at 13;
Aaron Back & J.R. Wu, China Flexes Global Merger Clout, Imposes Conditions on Lucite Deal,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2009, at B6.
116. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 28.
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contemplated under the Western approaches. It is this ability under
the AML to contemplate both social goals and arguably more parochial
concerns that may unsettle foreign observers worried about the
potential for aberrant conclusions.
C. The Only Thing(s) We Have to Fear... : The Core Concerns
Chief among the concerns of international businesses and
commentators regarding the AML is the possibility that China will, in
important cases, implement the AML in a parochial way to block
mergers that have a net positive effect on competition in order to
advance its own strategic goals. 117 This is particularly troubling
because when there is disagreement over the competitive effects of a
merger, the jurisdiction taking the most restrictive view will
control. 118 Thus, the AML enables China to block worldwide mergers
based on China's own special interests. 119 This is especially ominous
given that the AML appears to explicitly incorporate considerations
that the United States and European Union do not consider to be
legitimate antitrust concerns. 120 Such considerations create a risk that
the Chinese authorities might block economically beneficial
transnational mergers purely due to China's domestic social goals.
It is worth noting that some of the social goals China seeks to
pursue may be perfectly legitimate in light of its need to continue
developing its national economy. Although the consensus outside of
China is that goals such as the development of national industries
should be pursued through other laws, Westerners have very little
experience applying competition law in a situation like China's.
Experience in the laboratory of China may demonstrate that
incorporation of these considerations makes a very effective model for
developing-economy competition law.
Nonetheless, dangers abound if China experiments with these
considerations on cross-border mergers wherein China's "policy
considerations" may conflict with the interests of its international
peers. If China is perceived as externalizing the costs of social,

117. See STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, DEP'T OF INT'L RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, PAPER FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
COMMONWEALTH BUSINESS COUNCIL TRADE FORUM IN SOUTH AFRICA 9, http://www.lse.ac.uk
collections/internationalTradePolicyUnit/pdf/internationalCompetitionPlicyAndTheWorldTrade
Organization.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
118. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 162-63.

119. Id.
120. See, e.g., ABA Comments, supra note 103, at 2 (protection of the "national economy" and
"public interest" are not "appropriate considerations in a competition law").
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nationalistic, or political goals onto the rest of the international
economy, the ramifications could be serious. Firms may be
discouraged from investing in China, which would harm its economic
development, and political tensions with trading partners could also
harm China's economic interests. 121 If a disagreement over the
economic theory of "portfolio effects" could bring two similar, friendly
jurisdictions to heated rhetoric and accusations of "parochialism,"'122
what would happen if China blocked a benign cross-border merger in
order to promote the development of domestic firms in the industry?
Indeed, the first year of AML enforcement demonstrates these
very risks. The first public decision issued under the AML addressed
the November 2008 takeover of American brewer Anheuser-Busch by
Belgian rival InBev. 123 Though neither company was Chinese, the
merger was subject to AML review because both had significant
ownership stakes in Chinese breweries which competed with one
another. 124 The Chinese Ministry of Commerce approved the merger,
but imposed conditions on the merged firm that restricted its ability to
acquire or expand its stake in major Chinese breweries.
Though the Anheuser-Busch / InBev decision evoked only a
murmur of commentary from abroad, 25 a more troubling decision
came in March 2009 when the Ministry blocked Coca-Cola's proposed
acquisition of Huiyuan, a Chinese juice company. 126 Seeking to expand
its presence in China, Coca-Cola, which was number one in the juice
market in China in 2008, undertook to acquire Huiyuan, a successful
Chinese company that claimed the second largest market share. The
market concentration was relatively low, however, with the two firms
121. As a net exporter, China would face substantial risk that trading partners who
perceived protectionism in the implementation of the AML would implement retaliatory
measures against Chinese exports. See id. at 7 (inclusion of "objectives distinct from that of
preserving the competitive process.., is likely to chill investment in, and trade with, China").
122. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying discussion.
123. Li, supra note 115, at 13.
124. Anheuser-Busch had a 27 percent stake in Tsingtao Beer, and InBev had a 28.5 percent
stake in Zhujiang Beer. Associated Press, China Approves US-Belgian Beer Merger, USA TODAY,
Nov.
18,
2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-11-18-3455189696_x.htm?
loc=interstitialskip.
125. See, e.g., W. Stephen Smith et al., Morrison & Foerster Legal Update, InBev-AnheuserBusch: China's First Public Merger Decision Under the AML (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/14970.html
(suggesting that requirement of prior
approval for subsequent transactions is redundant, as significant acquisitions would be covered
by the AML, so the Ministry of Commerce would learn with experience that such conditions are
unnecessary); Xinzhu Zhang et al., The InBev and Anheuser-Busch Merger in China:A View from
Economists, ONLINE MAG. GLOBAL COMPETITION POL'Y, Dec. 11, 2008, http://papers.ssrn.
comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-1322526 (discussing the future of merger control in China).
126. Valerie Bauerlein & Gordon Fairclough, Beijing Thwarts Coke's Takeover Bid, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 19, 2009, at B1.
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having a combined market share around only eighteen to twenty
percent, depending on the definition of the relevant market. 127 Despite
market concentration levels that would have resulted in summary
approval under American and European analyses, 128 the Ministry
blocked the merger. The Ministry's explanatory public statement
reasoned that Coca-Cola would be able to use its dominant position in
the soda market to restrain competition in juice, thereby possibly
129
harming small competitors.
Observers were unconvinced. The consensus was that the
merger would not harm competition and therefore should have been
permitted. 130 The concerns pertaining to tying and bundling could
easily be addressed through narrowly tailored remedies and AML
enforcement. The perception abroad was that this decision was
primarily nationalistic, a response to public sentiment opposed to a
foreign corporation acquiring a strong Chinese brand. 131 Although the
Ministry unsurprisingly denied that nationalism played a role, 132 the
decision served to amplify existing fears that the AML would be
misused against foreign investors. 13 3 Whether or not the decision was
actually motivated by nationalist concerns, it has undoubtedly added
weight and immediacy to fears of parochialism.
Opaque, unpredictable decisions that seem more consistent
with nationalism than with effective competition policy create
considerable costs. Foreign investors will be hesitant to invest in
China, thereby diminishing the value of successful Chinese brands
and companies and slowing China's economic development.134
127. Patrick Chovanec, Beijing's Antitrust Blunder, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 23, 2009, at 15
(citing "2008 market share data from Euromonitor").
128. See DOJ/FTCMerger Guidelines, supra note 26, § 1.5 (creating safe harbor for mergers
with HHI of less than 1000); Chovanec, supra note 127, at 15 ("[Tjhe transaction produces HHI
scores that would have resulted in a summary dismissal of antitrust concerns in either the U.S.
or EU.").
129. Statement of the Ministry of Commerce, China's Statement Blocking Coca-Cola
Huiyuan Deal, WALL ST. J., CHINA JOURNAL, Mar. 18, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinajournal/
2009/03/18/china%E2%80%99s-statement-blocking-coca-cola-huiyuan-deal.
130. Chovanec, supra note 127, at 15.
131. Sundeep Tucker & Jamil Anderlini, Coke's Rejection is to Chinese Public's Taste, FIN.
TIMES (Online), Mar. 18, 2009, available at http://www.ft.comlcms/s/0/9df57384-13dl-llde-9e320000779fd2ac.html.
132. Veto of Coke Bid is Not Protectionism; China Says Welcomes Inbound M&A By Foreign
Firms, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 23, 2009, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/200903/23/content_7606202.htm.
133. Sundeep Tucker and Jamil Anderlini, China's Block on Coke Bid Raises Alarm Over
M&A, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 19, 2009, at 23.
134. See Chovanec, supra note 127. This is so because the antitrust doubts reduce the
willingness of investors to purchase successful brands and companies from Chinese owners, in
turn reducing the likely return on an investment in the company's shares.
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Simultaneously, Chinese companies seeking to invest abroad may find
themselves the targets of retaliatory protectionism. 135 For example,
within hours of the announcement of the Coca-Cola decision,
Australian politicians were already using this perceived protectionism
as justification for their own favored protectionist policies. 136 If China
blocks a future proposed merger for seemingly nationalist reasons, the
parties to the transaction will not be the only losers.
In addition to these issues pertaining to China's substantive
analysis, there is a final procedural concern about Chinese merger
review that relates to the addition of another major regulatory hurdle
for transnational mergers. Such deals require submissions to an everincreasing number of antitrust authorities, and China's new presence
as another major player in this already-crowded field may increase
transactional costs to the point that otherwise efficient mergers are
deterred. 137 Although such concerns can be addressed to some extent
by cooperation among the authorities, as is done between the United
States and the European Union under their Best Practices, this
cannot fully eliminate the burdens of discerning and complying with
the requirements of so many jurisdictions. The expected expense of
dealing with China's merger review will be even higher-and more
discouraging-so long as the fears and uncertainty augmented by the
Coca-Cola decision remain. Early experience has shown that the
threats outlined above, both substantive and procedural, are real. The
next Part will analyze methods of minimizing the risks posed by
Chinese antitrust merger review.
III. GETTING TO HARMONIOUS ANTITRUST: PROPOSALS ANALYZED
With the advent of the AML, the international antitrust
community is focused on how to minimize the systemic risks posed by
Chinese antitrust enforcement. Beyond the more general international
convergence efforts outlined above in Part II.A.3, this will depend on
measures that are internal to China. This Part analyzes the existing
proposals and their likely efficacy for helping Chinese merger review
achieve China's goals while integrating smoothly into the world of

135. Canning Coke: China Can't Keep Buying Abroad and Reject Suitors At Home, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 20, 2009, at 10.
136. See Peter Smith, China's Move Stirs Australian Concerns, FINANCIAL TIMES (Online),
Mar.
18,
2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/71d0e09c- 13d4- llde-9e32-0000779fd2ac.html
(reporting that Australian politicians were using the Chinese merger decision to support their
efforts to block investments by Chinese companies in major Australian companies).
137. Donald Baker, Antitrust Merger Review in an Era of Escalating Cross-Border
Transactionsand Effects, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 577, 587 (2000).
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international antitrust. Part III.A analyzes suggestions, primarily
from Western commentators, for specific changes in the AML and
related regulations in order to make the law more consistent with
emerging international norms. Many of these same experts
commented on earlier drafts and continue to advocate these changes.
Because the law is already in effect, however, Part III.B examines
proposals to address these concerns through delayed implementation
of the existing laws. The exposed weaknesses in both approaches point
the way to the solution proposed in Part IV of this Note.
A. "Play Our Game"- Changingor Reinterpretingthe Rules
Throughout the AML drafting process, China solicited
comments from experts both within China and abroad.13 8 This means
that most of the proposals for how to draft and implement the AML
were presented to the relevant Chinese officials and considered by
them during the drafting process. The process of soliciting input to the
law and its implementation continues today in the form of various
regular bilateral discussions and other programs, most notably
between China and the United States and between China and the
European Union. 13 9 Although China is unlikely to amend the AML to
incorporate already-rejected suggestions, these recommendations may
still be useful because Chinese officials continuously seek to learn
from foreign experience and could incorporate these lessons through
regulations or future interpretations and applications of the law.

138. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
139. Officials and scholars from the United States and China have discussed the AML
through such programs as the U.S.-China Legal Exchange, held in the United States in
December 2006, see U.S. Commercial Service Website, 2006 China Legal Exchange,
http://www.buyusa.gov/asianow/chinalegalexchange.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009), and a
series of seminars in China and visits to the United States by Chinese officials sponsored by the
United States Trade and Development Agency, see Press Release, U.S. Trade and Dev. Agency,
USTDA Initiative Promotes U.S.-China Cooperation Towards Effective Anti-Monopoly Law
Implementation,
Mar.
7,
2008,
available
at
http://www.ustda.gov/news/press
releases/2008/EastAsiaiChinaChinaAML_030708.asp. Officials and scholars from the European
Union and China have discussed the AML through programs such as the E.U.-China Conference
on Competition Policy, E.U.-China Trade Project Website, http://www.euchinawto.org/index.php?
option=comcontent&task=view&id=85&Itemid=54 (last visited Sept. 11, 2009), and through
study visits and internships for Chinese officials to the European Union. Directorate General of
Competition, see E.U.-China Trade Project Website - Study Visit: Merger Control,
http://www.euchinawto.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=176&Itemid=54
(last
visited Sept. 11, 2009); E.U.-China Trade Project Website - Internship at EC Directorate
General for Competition, http://www.euchinawto.org/index.php?
option=com content&task
=view&id=214&Itemid=54 (last visited Sept. 11, 2009); see also Terms of Reference of the EUChina Competition Policy Dialogue (May 6, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
internationallbilateral/cn2b-en.pdf.
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The most common advice of international observers is that both
the substantive and procedural requirements of the AML should
comply with the "Recommended Practices" of the International
Competition Network ("ICN"), 140 which reflect the consensus of over
one hundred national competition authorities.' 4 ' The core of these
recommendations can be easily summarized: bring the AML into
compliance with the international consensus towards which the
competition community is converging.
The suggested substantive changes to the AML center on the
factors considered in merger evaluation rather than the standard
itself. The basic phrasing of the standard that the AML applies to
mergers looks much like that used in the United States and
elsewhere. 14 2 Nevertheless, there are some significant differences in
the factors to be considered in evaluating a merger, which have
provoked some unease. 43 The core concern cited regarding the AML
factors is that they look beyond the competitive effect of the merger,
particularly by focusing on competitors and "national economic
' 44
development."'
The AML's broad list of considerations, as compared to
international standards, causes concern because it may create
unpredictability for parties as well as the opportunity for Chinese
authorities to block mergers that are not harmful to competition. By
contrast, the consensus among the international competition
enforcement community, as represented by the ICN, is that antitrust
merger review "should focus exclusively on identifying and preventing
or remedying anticompetitive mergers. A merger review law should
not be used to pursue other goals."1 45 Similarly, Western

140. See ABA Comments, supra note 103, at 21-26 (recommending changes to at least five
Articles in order to be consistent with ICN's Recommended Practices in the relevant areas).
141. Kallay, supra note 93; see also discussion supra Part II.A.3.
142. See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 28 (barring any merger that "has the effect of
restricting or eliminating competition").
143. Id. art. 27. These factors are discussed supra note 105 and accompanying text.
144. William Blumenthal, Presentation to the International Symposium on the Draft AntiMonopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (May 23-24, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speecheslblumenthal/
20050523SCLAOFinal.pdf [hereinafter Blumenthal,
Presentation]; ABA Comments, supra note 103, at 2; Antitrust Committee of the International
Bar Association, Working Group on the Development of Competition Law in the People's
Republic of China, Comments on the Draft Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) (Draft of 27 July, 2005), 46 (Aug. 23, 2005), available at http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/
AntitrustTradeLawSectionlAntitrust/DevCompLawPRC.aspx
[hereinafter IBA Working
Group Comments].
145. International Competition Network, Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, §
I(A),
cmt.
1
(2008),
available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org
mediallibrary/CartelsfMerger WGl.pdf.
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commentators argue that the AML should not consider a merger's
effect on competitors; improved efficiency often harms rivals of the
improved firm, so their complaints do not show that the merger has
the effect of "restricting or eliminating competition."'146 China's
significant divergence from the norm by incorporating these
considerations has the potential to lead to determinations on the
merits of transnational mergers that conflict with the conclusions of
other authorities. For this reason, commentators have consistently
147
advocated a more narrowly focused merger evaluation.
From the Chinese perspective, however, it might not be in
China's best interest to strictly adhere to American and European
precepts of narrow focus in merger review. China is a developing
country, which may require it to take a slightly different perspective
in close cases than the United States and European Union would
take.1 48 Western antitrust experts do not have all the answers in this
context and perhaps should not prevent China from seeking the
answers itself. To consider a merger's effect on development and
competitors is not necessarily to harm consumers. Using a limiting
principle that prohibits harming consumers through antitrust
enforcement,1 49 Chinese authorities might best aid their developing
economy by blocking mergers where there is neither a clear benefit
nor a clear harm to consumers, but there is definite harm to
development through shutting local firms out of the market. 150 Such
decisions could, in some cases, conflict with American or European
decisions to permit mergers without modification where it is unclear
that consumers either suffer or benefit. In such cases, however, the
United States and European Union might have a weaker interest, in
terms of competition policy, in permitting the merger. Though their
own regimes would allow such a merger, the Western authorities are
unlikely to rattle their sabers if the merger's benefits to consumers are
unclear, particularly if they consider the potential positive impact on
international development. If this minor shift enables developing
countries to aid their development through antitrust enforcement

146. Blumenthal, Presentation, supra note 144, at 7.
147. Id.; Pamela Jones Harbour, Remarks before the New York State Bar Association
International Law and Practice Section in Shanghai (Oct. 20, 2006).
148. Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 Sw.
J. L. & TRADE AM. 211, 228-29 (2007) [hereinafter Fox, The Other Path].
149. Such a limiting principle may, in fact, be embodied in AML Article 28, providing that
the authorities "shall not prohibit" a merger where "the positive effect on competition is greater
than the negative effect." Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2.
150. Fox, The Other Path, supranote 148, at 229 n.66.
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without harming consumers, it could be a valuable decision both for
antitrust theory and for economic development around the world.
One of the most significant procedural complaints about the
AML concerns the thresholds above which parties must notify
enforcement authorities of a proposed merger. The draft provisions
based notification on whether one party has assets, sales, or market
share in China that exceed certain thresholds. 15 1 During the drafting
process, commentators recognized that these provisions would require
notification to the Chinese authorities of transactions above the
thresholds, even if the firm being acquired had no presence or sales in
China. 15 2 The ABA, citing the ICN Recommended Practices, suggested
that the AML be redrafted to incorporate significant changes,
including modifying the thresholds to focus on assets and sales of the
acquired company in an acquisition.153 Furthermore, the ABA
suggested giving the Chinese State Council the authority to
promulgate the notification thresholds in the form of regulations and
thereby avoid the legislative amendment process when making
154
changes to such thresholds.
The version of the AML that was enacted incorporated some,
but not all, of these recommendations: the statute itself does not set
forth any thresholds, instead providing that notification thresholds
shall be promulgated by the State Council.1 55 Shortly after the AML
became effective, the State Council promulgated the Regulation on
Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings. 15 6 This
regulation shifted the focus to revenue within China of at least two
parties-a step in the right direction.' 57 As one group of commentators
has pointed out, though, the regulation does not focus on the Chinese
turnover of the acquired firm. Thus, the regulation leaves open the
possibility that an acquisition of a firm with no presence in China-for
example, as part of a three-party transaction, or where the acquired

151. ABA Comments, supra note 103, at 22-23.
152. Id. The ABA also pointed out that market share should not be used for notification
thresholds, because it can only be calculated after other significant analytical steps; market
share was subsequently removed, resolving this concern. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 23.
155. Anti-Monopoly Law, supranote 2, art. 21.
156. Available in Chinese at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-08/04/content_1063769.htm. See
Peter Wang, Yizhe Yang & H. Stephen Harris, Jr., China: New Merger Notification Thresholds
Under The AML Published, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=64738
(Aug. 29, 2008), for an English summary. Note that, as discussed supra note 28, the term
"concentrations" refers to mergers and acquisitions, for which this Note generally uses the term
mergers."

157. Wang, Yang & Harris, supra note 156.
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firm is a subsidiary of a firm with a significant presence in Chinawould have to be reported to the Chinese authorities. 158 To those
concerned about additional procedural burdens on merging parties
and the possibility of China strategically interfering with mergers that
have no real nexus to China, these notification thresholds are
worrisome. Commentators throughout the drafting process advocated
setting notification thresholds which ensure that only mergers with a
sufficient nexus to China are captured. 159 Undoubtedly such observers
will continue to push for changes to the notification thresholds,
especially since they are contained in regulations that are relatively
easy to alter.
On the other hand, if these mergers actually have no nexus to
China, by definition they have no impact on the Chinese market.
Therefore, is there truly any cause for concern? Put another way, if
China has no interest in these mergers, why would its government
devote valuable administrative resources to reviewing and blocking
such a merger, especially considering the certain international outcry
it would provoke? If China has no interest in these cases and will
neither seek nor review information from parties that do not report
mergers purely external to China, parties likely would soon learn not
to report such transactions. Thus, there is no need to devote resources
to amending the thresholds.
It is imaginable that there may be some limited danger, from
the international perspective, in not amending the thresholds because
they may leave some room for the Chinese authorities to deliberately
block a merger that affects only a foreign market when a Chinese firm
in the same market would be disadvantaged. In reality, however, the
diplomatic and trade-relations costs to such an enforcement decision
would probably be prohibitive. Therefore, the failure of the thresholds
158. Id. ("Because the Regulation does not... require that the target have operations or any
particular level of sales in China, the Regulation may catch transactions with little, if any,
connection to China."). Where there are three or more entities, "a filing would be required even if
two of the acquiring undertakings each have China-wide turnovers in excess of [the threshold]
but the acquired business has no sales or presence in China." Id. As to two-party deals with no
competitive impact in China, "[China's Ministry of Commerce] has historically interpreted, and
presumably will continue to interpret, a 'party' to mean the entire group of affiliated companies."
Id. Therefore, an acquired subsidiary with no business in China may exceed the Chinese revenue
threshold due to its parent company's dealings in China.
159. Pamela Jones Harbour, Remarks before the New York State Bar Association
International Law and Practice Section in Shanghai (Oct. 20, 2006); see also Wang Xiaoye,
Presentation to the EU-China Conference on Competition Policy (Apr. 22, 2005) available at
http://www.euchinawto.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=85&Itemid=54
(giving the example of Coca-Cola acquiring a small bottler in Russia as a transaction that would
be subject to Chinese regulation under the draft provisions, despite having little effect on
competition in China).
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to require a "sufficient nexus" to China probably does not pose a
significant threat to international mergers external to China.
The final procedural concern that commentators have
expressed about merger review under the AML is about the definition
of "control." Although the AML makes "control" of another corporation
the trigger for its reporting requirement, it fails to define the term.
This is a key ambiguity because if one corporation acquires shares in
another, but not enough to give it control, the transaction is not a
merger at all and antitrust merger review is irrelevant. 16 0 Absent a
clear definition, parties may not be certain whether, for example,
acquiring a forty-five percent stake in a corporation would trigger
notification responsibilities. The lack of a clear standard here adds
161
more procedural confusion to an already convoluted process.
Although a draft of the Regulation on Notification of Concentrations
that included factors for determining whether "control" has been
acquired was circulated in March 2008, the Regulation promulgated in
162
August 2008 did not have any provisions to help define the term.
This means that an acquiring business cannot be certain whether its
transaction will give it "control," prompting its obligation to notify the
Chinese authorities. 163 Although this does not pose any direct
substantive threat to international mergers, the lack of clarity
certainly adds to the procedural burdens of international merger
review. The course commentators accordingly recommend is to
explicitly define "control" in a new provision in the Regulation. 164 An
oft-cited model is that used under the American Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
and its implementing regulations, which define "control" as ownership
65
of at least fifty percent of a firm's voting shares.
The central problem with all of these suggestions, however, is
that the enacted law has already come out the other side of China's
process of thoroughly consulting with international antitrust scholars
and practitioners during the drafting process. For the more procedural
aspects of the law, perhaps it may be possible to make changes that
reduce threats to international mergers without impinging on China's
sovereign interests, thereby making continuing discussions on possible

160. See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 20 (whether a transaction is an "Operator
consolidation" under the AML, and thus subject to the Article 21 reporting requirements, turns
on whether "[o]ne Operator gain[s] controlling rights in another Operator").
161. Blumenthal, Presentation, supra note 144, at 8-9; IBA Working Group Comments,
supra note 144, at 35-36.
162. Wang, Yang & Harris, supra note 156.

163. Id.
164. Blumenthal, Presentation, supra note 144, at 8-9 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b) (2009)).

165. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b).
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changes to procedural regulations viable. However, it is unlikely that
future advocacy will result in any changes in the law itself. China will
consider foreign advice, but the starting point for Chinese merger
review has already been set.
The reality is that China has made its decision and intends to
consider the effect that mergers will have on development. Any efforts
in this area should focus on aiding Chinese regulators in ensuring that
they do not make decisions that harm consumers in the name of
"national economic development." 166 To the extent that the Western
antitrust community is actually concerned about China applying the
AML to mergers in a way that either (a) blocks mergers that would
increase consumer welfare in Western countries or (b) imposes
procedural costs that would deter such beneficial mergers, these
concerns may be addressed in ways that are less intrusive on China's
sovereign policy decisions than amending the law and regulations. In
particular, the approach of gradually phasing in implementation,
discussed in the next Part, could help reduce the risk of the Chinese
authorities making decisions that are harmful to the international
economy. If these risks can be avoided without any foreign pressure on
China to "conform" to Western principles, it will benefit all sides.
167
B. 'A Journey of a Thousand Miles Begins with a Single Step"

While the proposals outlined above have focused on direct
communication with and advocacy to the Chinese government in an
effort to modify the AML to become more compliant with international
norms, other commentators have suggested that the most effective
way for Chinese antitrust to develop consistency with these norms is
through gradual experience. 168 By "phasing in" AML enforcement,
China would be able to gain confidence in competitive markets and in
antitrust law while developing institutional capability for effective
enforcement before moving on to more complex issues such as

mergers. 169

166. One way this goal can be achieved is through focus on the limiting principle, as
discussed supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text, and possibly embodied in AML Article 28.
167. LAO Tzu, TAO TE CHING, ch. 64 (Stephen Mitchell trans., Harper Collins Publishers
1988).
168. R. Hewitt Pate, What I Heard in The Great Hall of the People - Realistic Expectations of
Chinese Antitrust, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 201 (2008).
169. Id. at 209.
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This more gradual approach recommends that China "start
with the basics" in the enforcement of the AML. 170 In this view, "the
basics" means focusing on cartels and government restrictions on
competition. 171 By starting with the detection and elimination of
cartels, the enforcing authorities will gain experience on issues where
the rules and the economic benefits from enforcement are clear. 172
This will help both in terms of administering the rules in a "consistent
and just" manner, thereby augmenting the legitimacy of antitrust, and
also in terms of introducing the Chinese public to competition law in a
manner that is understandable to them. 173 Because "[flixed prices take
money directly from the pockets of consumers," addressing such
behavior will create the most immediate benefits to the Chinese public
and thus create crucial early public support for the AML.1 74
Commentators also recommend an early focus on enforcing the
AML's restrictions on protectionism by local government 175 because
this area promises similar clarity and potential for immediate
economic benefit.176 In transition economies such as China's,
government-imposed barriers to entry are among the most significant
restraints on competition, so eliminating these restraints can create
some of the most substantial and immediate economic benefits from
AML enforcement.177 Focusing on government restraints will also help
gain private sector support for antitrust enforcement and reduce
corruption. 178 At the same time, tackling cases where evidence will be

170. Id.; William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions
in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 403, 444-46 (1997) [hereinafter Kovacic, Getting
Started].
171. Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 170, at 445.
172. Pate, supra note 168, at 196; Bing Song, Competition Policy in a TransitionalEconomy:
The Case of China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 387, 401, 408 (1995).
173. Pate, supra note 168, at 209.
174. Id. at 209; accord Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 170, at 449-50 (encouraging the
agency to "resist political demands that it take action that would reduce competition and restrict
consumer choice").

175. These provisions are contained in Chapter 5 of the AML. Anti-Monopoly Law, supra
note 2, arts. 32-37.
176. Pate, supra note 168, at 209; see also William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in
Transition: Antitrust Controls on Acquisitions in Emerging Markets, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1075,
1110 (1998) (recommending focus on government impediments to competition as a top initial
priority in the competition policy of transition economies); Salil K. Mehra & Yeng Manbei,
Against Antitrust Functionalism:Reconsidering China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT'L L.
379, 411-12 (2009) (discussing enforcement of the AML).
177. Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 170, at 441.
178. Id. at 442.
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relatively easy to find will make it easier for the authorities to gain
179
experience in enforcing the AML.
Some commentators have argued that government control over
the judiciary is such that it will interfere with effective enforcement of
the anti-protectionist provisions of the AML. 180 However, because
these provisions effectively function as a domestic free trade
agreement, local governments should recognize the win-win nature of
the provisions and thus cooperate in lowering their barriers to
trade.1 81 If local and regional officials become familiar with the
reasons for enforcing these provisions, they will understand how they
stand to gain from uniform nationwide enforcement.1 8 2 Thus, their
influence over the judiciary will not bar effective administration of the
AML. Experience with the benefits created by this regulation may, in
fact, encourage local and regional officials to trust in competition and
competition law, thereby resulting in far-reaching effects that will
ultimately aid effective enforcement of the more complex aspects of
18 3
the law, such as merger review.
This approach is based on a realization that China comes to
antitrust with a very different history than that of jurisdictions such
as the United States and the European Union, which themselves took
many decades to develop merger review to its present stage. It will
take time for China to develop the capacity for effective enforcement
in the more complex areas of competition law.18 4 Furthermore, China
has no experience with judicial review of governmental action, which
in the Western nations is fundamental to the relationship between the
regulators and the regulated.18 5 Both impartial review of agency
decisions and the ability to take action that is unpopular with other
government entities are essential to accurate decisionmaking.
Officials need to develop familiarity with the intricacies of antitrust
review, a process which will be aided through experience, involvement

179. Id. To wit, the relevant facts behind a governmental decision, such as the denial of a
permit or license, are usually quickly discernible.
180. Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China's WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial Review:
Impact on Legal and PoliticalReform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 95-96 (2004); Pate, supra note 168,
at 209.
181. See Mehra & Yeng, supra note 176, at 424-26 (citing Daniel A. Farber & Robert E.
Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (1994)).
182. Mehra & Yeng, supra note 176, at 427-28.
183. Id. at 411.
184. Pate, supra note 168, at 195-96; see also D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International
Antitrust and Improving Antitrust Agency Capacity, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 242, 242-43
(2008) ("There is a learning curve for young antitrust agencies.").
185. Pate, supra note 168, at 208.
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with international institutions, and technical assistance from agencies
such as the DOJ, FTC, and European Commission.1 8 6 The judges and
officials who review any disputes arising from agency determinations
will become more effective in these duties both through specific
training on the competition policy issues involved and through
experience gained from specializing in AML appeals.1 8 7 Because
phased implementation deploys regulatory resources in the areas
where they will be most effective first and helps officials lay the
groundwork for effective merger enforcement later, this approach will
assist the Chinese authorities in developing the institutional
knowledge that they will need for broader enforcement later.
In addition, China has different needs and goals than do the
established antitrust pillars of the United States and European
Union. China's approach to antitrust will inevitably be different from
the Western approach.188 For instance, the Chinese government places
a great deal of emphasis on stability in its society, and the
development of a "harmonious society" is an oft-repeated core goal of
its governance.18 9 To the extent that competition results in upheaval
in markets and corresponding job losses, the government tends to be
wary in its approach toward competition.1 90 A key benefit of this
approach is that experience with the economic benefits of AML
enforcement will help assuage skepticism of the ability of competitive
markets to achieve China's important social, economic, and
developmental goals.
This gradual approach to convergence of Chinese antitrust to
international norms is certainly promising. It is based on a solid
understanding of the challenges facing young competition authorities
in transition economies and the likely hesitance that the Chinese
government will feel in putting their confidence in competition in
order to achieve important social and economic goals. Gaining
familiarity with antitrust enforcement by beginning with its simplest
concepts minimizes both the administrative cost of enforcement and
the risk of error in interpretation or application. The approach also
has the advantage of providing significant direct benefits to
consumers, which will give an early boost to public confidence in
competition.

186. See generally Sokol, supra note 184, at 242.
187. Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 170, at 420-21.
188. Pate, supra note 168, at 211; see discussion supra Part III.A.
189. See John Delury, "Harmonious" in China, 148 POL'Y REV. 35, 35 (2008) (discussing
China's discourse of "harmony" and its origins in Confucian thought).
190. Harris, supra note 1, at 177.
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In sum, this proposed approach to Chinese merger analysis is
that, while the authorities gain experience by working against cartels
and local administrative monopolies, more complex issues such as
merger analysis are put on a backburner. Meanwhile, the
international competition community would continue to engage
Chinese officials in discussions about their perception of the goals of
antitrust law1 91 and to support institutional reforms such as judicial
independence, believing such reforms present the best opportunity to
192
avoid merger decisions that are contrary to competition theory.
The significant flaw in this approach, however, is that it
assumes more patience than Chinese authorities are likely to exercise
with respect to mergers. This approach appears to depend on the
questionable assumption that the Chinese authorities would be
willing to refrain from merger regulation until both (a) the
international antitrust community has had time to convince them to
conform to international norms, and (b) they have developed a
judiciary that is more independent and an antitrust establishment
that agrees with Western principles of merger analysis.
But this proposal, unfortunately, is likely a moot point. Given
that the law is already in effect and that merging parties are already
required to notify the authorities of their combinations, it was never
likely that China would wait to get significantly involved in merger
review. Instead, the authorities are more disposed to begin
enforcement activity with respect to mergers early. Indeed, the first
193
year of experience, with decisions such as the Coca-Cola veto,
demonstrates that China will not wait. What is needed, then, is a
solution that will incorporate gradual implementation of AML
enforcement, build upon the likelihood of early merger enforcement,
and create the conditions for effective Chinese merger review that will
benefit the Chinese economy and will not harm the global economy.
IV. DO TRY THIS AT HOME, FIRST: A WORKABLE SOLUTION
In order to minimize both procedural and substantive risks to
the world market, most Western commentators believe that Chinese
merger review should be brought in line with prevailing international
norms.' 94 However, engagement and advocacy for an AML that
mirrors the workings and goals of international antitrust have fallen

191. Pate, supra note 168, at 210.

192. Id.
193. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
194. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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somewhat short of producing a law clear of potential conflicts with
Western antitrust regimes. China will seek to address its somewhat
unique concerns as a developing economy by considering, as part of its
antitrust analysis, the effect of mergers on national development.
Whatever one thinks about the merits of this approach relative to the
West's narrow consumer-focused approach, Chinese merger review
presents the following question: What can be done to avoid
experimentation with this novel approach harming competition in the
world economy and consumers everywhere?
China's particular social goals and institutional realities mean
that Chinese antitrust is most likely to succeed if it begins by phasing
in implementation of enforcement. 195 The flaw in trying to begin
enforcement by focusing only on cartels and "administrative
monopoly," however, lies in the reality that China will not wait until
after it has completed complex institutional reforms and gained
extensive experience in antitrust enforcement to implement merger
enforcement. Engagement and support for judicial independence will
certainly help develop effective enforcement in the long run, 196 but
such longitudinal efforts leave a significant time gap during which
China will be enforcing the AML's merger provisions, as it is already
doing. The key is finding a way to apply similar concepts of phased
implementation and institutional learning directly to immediate
merger enforcement.
Given this reality, the best way to develop merger review that
benefits China's citizens and minimizes international friction is to
begin merger enforcement early, focusing on the domestic: China
should allow purely domestic mergers with pro-competitive benefits
and block domestic mergers that would clearly harm competition. By
starting merger enforcement early while substantially holding off on
international mergers, 197 the Chinese public will receive the greatest
benefit and will be able to see the most explicit examples of these
benefits. At the same time, the government can minimize the
perceived threats, both substantive and procedural, to international
markets. China can then refine its analysis through experience on
domestic mergers, learning empirically whether the consideration of

195. Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 170, at 444-46; Pate, supra note 168, at 196.
196. Pate, supra note 168, at 210.
197. The fact that China has already begun antitrust enforcement on international mergers,
see supra notes 123-33 and accompanying discussion, does not make this argument moot
because the Ministry of Commerce can fairly easily shift more resources to domestic merger
review, retaining just enough international merger review resources to protect against the most
egregiously anticompetitive cross-border mergers.
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development and rival firms successfully achieves their goal of
furthering development without harming competition or consumers.
A. Phased Implementation Can Solve the Substantive Concerns with
the Anti-Monopoly Law
From the perspective of most Western commentators, the
substantive overbreadth of China's goals in implementing the AML
has its origins in a lack of trust in competition to create prosperity and
a concern about the instability that competition creates. 198 The
centrality of stability as a social goal of the Chinese government
means that the government is unlikely to be dissuaded from
considering factors such as a merger's impact on national economic
development and rivals, as rivals' bankruptcies and plant closings will
create unemployment and prevent local industry from taking root. 199
For their part, Western commentators fear that these considerations
will tend to discourage mergers that increase efficiency in cases where
inefficient plants or rivals would close. 200 The authorities will likely
feel compelled to block such mergers or shape consent decrees to
protect labor and local industry. 20 1 Indeed, this compulsion likely will
be the greatest when enforcers are confronted with cross-border
mergers, wherein the consolidation will result in some plants in China
closing and some of the profits being enjoyed by overseas
shareholders, who may also acquire a treasured Chinese brand. Such
transactions would understandably give any government agent pause,
particularly where the government places such emphasis on avoiding
instability.
The early stages of Chinese merger enforcement, therefore,
must proceed in a way that builds confidence in competition so
mergers that ultimately benefit consumers will not be blocked, even in
the case of cross-border mergers. The best way for China to overcome
its natural hesitation in such situations is to begin by gaining
experience with domestic mergers, where all benefit to be gained from
the merger will stay within the Chinese economy: Chinese consumers
will benefit from lower prices and improved goods and services, and

198. Blumenthal, Presentation, supra note 144, at 7.
199. Fox, The Other Path,supra note 148, at 230.
200. Pate, supranote 168, at 201-02.
201. To the extent that they do so, they may reduce China's prosperity as consumers do not
get the best products at the lowest prices available through increased efficiency, and cause
friction in the global economy as firms with ties to China will be discouraged from efficient
combinations. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 568-70 (discussing the role of efficiencies in the
determination of whether a merger is anticompetitive).
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Chinese firms will benefit from increased profits. Because the political
cost of allowing such a transaction to proceed will be much lower than
one involving a foreign corporation, it will be easier for the authorities
to take what may be perceived as a risk in approving the merger.
Though in the short term some jobs may be lost as plants close or as
inefficient rivals lose market share, the net benefits will be quite
20 2
broadly shared.
Indeed, starting with domestic mergers would likely help the
Chinese agencies learn how they can most effectively consider the
factors of development and the effect on competitors within the scope
of merger analysis. In a domestic merger, there would be no risk of
political pressure tempting officials to overreach by blocking a merger
that benefits consumers in order to protect Chinese companies. Where
a domestic merger neither harms nor benefits consumers but would be
likely to impede economic development, the officials could experiment
with either blocking the merger or extracting remedies designed to
remove the impediments to development. 20 3 By doing this in the
domestic context, China would be able to discover whether this
approach is, in fact, economically beneficial, as all effects would be felt
within its own borders. If such an approach worked domestically, the
Chinese authorities could then apply their learning in cross-border
mergers with less risk of imposing costs on sister jurisdictions around
the world. If the decision resulted in significant costs, the regulators
would be able to fine-tune their approach on the next such merger
without having to worry about international repercussions from their
experimentation.
Skeptics may contend that experimenting with merger analysis
that incorporates the consideration of economic development in the
domestic context would not be effective because some development
concerns would not apply the same way domestically as they do in
cross-border mergers. For instance, where there are no foreign firms
involved, there is no risk of domestic firms being pushed out of
markets by large foreign firms who will not contribute to domestic
development, such as by providing skilled jobs in the country. In the

202. Ideally, most of the early mergers reviewed and approved would be ones where the
efficiencies are significant enough that the average consumer benefits in a visible way, thereby
increasing the public and governmental comfort level with such decisions.
203. As long as this experimentation is limited to where the parties cannot show the merger
would increase efficiency, this will not be as harmful to consumers as some commentators fear.
See Fox, The Other Path, supra note 148, at 229 (observing that "handicap[ping] the efficiencies
of the dominant firm and thereby harm[ing] . . . consumers . . . was not the problem in the

forefront of our minds" as developing country policymakers; abuse of dominance and other
anticompetitive practices are more significant concerns in this context).
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context of China, however, there is a way around this critique. China
is a very large country, with very diverse economic conditions from one
region to another. 2 4 Therefore, a merger between Shanghai-based
companies that may affect economic development in Xinjiang may
provide a good test case for these purposes.
By implementing Chinese merger review in this manner, the
Chinese authorities would gain competence in antitrust enforcement
and develop principles for a form of merger review that aids economic
development, without risking international tension. As an added
bonus from the perspective of international business, the authorities
may be able to explicate their approach to merger analysis by drafting
a set of Merger Guidelines, similar in format to those of the United
States and European Union, based on their experience in domestic
mergers. 20 5 This transparency would significantly reduce the perceived
substantive threat posed to transnational mergers.
B. Phased Implementation Can Solve the ProceduralConcerns with the
Anti-Monopoly Law
Just as an initial focus on domestic mergers would alleviate
many of the substantive concerns on the application of the AML, such
an approach would also help bring about the procedural changes
sought by the international antitrust community. For instance, this
approach would encourage Chinese authorities to clarify what it
means to obtain "controlling rights" in a firm. 20 6 Under the present
vagueness of the AML, in order to determine whether a given
transaction needs to be reported because it involves acquisition of
"controlling rights," both foreign and domestic companies must either
ask the authorities for guidance or make the decision based on their
own judgment. If they ask the authorities for guidance, the apparent
room for subjectivity will mean that the authorities will have to
undertake a fairly substantial review in each instance just to decide
whether the parties even have to file "notification" information. If the
companies decide for themselves, it is possible that the authorities will
learn of the transaction independently, conclude that control has been
acquired, seek the notification information, and then possibly block
the merger or even punish the firms for failure to comply with their

204. See

CIA

WORLD

FACTBOOK,

https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) ("Economic development has been more
rapid in coastal provinces than in the interior.").
205. Kovacic, Getting Started, supranote 170, at 436-37.
206. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying discussion.
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notification obligations. 207 Alternatively, companies will take the safe
route and report any acquisition of a significant stake in a firm, even
if it falls well short of fifty percent, thereby leading to costly and
needless work on the part of the regulating authorities. Any of these
circumstances will impose significant administrative costs simply as a
result of companies' uncertainty.
As the Chinese authorities gain experience across domestic
cases, this would create a clear incentive to develop and clarify the
standard for "controlling rights." The administrative costs, combined
with the complaints that the Chinese government would invariably
receive from domestic companies, would likely convince the
authorities to promulgate an objective standard. Any clear standard
that is published would then help alleviate the procedural confusion
facing international businesses as China turns its attention to crossborder transactions. The antitrust community can therefore expect the
phased-in implementation of merger review to help alleviate this
procedural threat to international mergers.
On the other hand, critics may contend that a phased-in
approach focusing on domestic mergers will not address the
procedural concerns over application of AML notification thresholds to
mergers in which the acquired firm has no significant connection to
China. 20 8 Such concerns will not become relevant until the authorities
begin to devote their attention to cross-border mergers, and thus the
earliest experiences under this plan would not lead to any changes in
this area. Once the authorities begin to shift their focus to the
international arena, however, there is some chance that China will
make the changes sought by international commentators. If this does
happen, it will be for reasons similar to those for the clarification of
"control." The overinclusiveness of the thresholds would mean that the
enforcers would be devoting resources to receiving and reviewing
information on transactions with no nexus to China-in other words,
transactions in which they have no real interest.20 9
Moreover, many of these transactions would likely involve
Chinese firms acquiring overseas firms that have no operations in

207. See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 21 ("When Operator consolidation reaches
certain standards for declaration as designated by the State Council, relevant Operators shall
report the consolidation to the State Council anti-monopoly law enforcement authorities prior to
implementation. If a declaration is not made, the consolidation may not be carried out.").
208. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying discussion.

209. See

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES 1 (2002), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.
org/media/archive06l1/mnprecpractices.pdf (advocating that "jurisdiction should be asserted
only over those transactions that have an appropriate nexus with the jurisdiction concerned").
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China. This means that a substantial portion of the cost of the overinclusiveness would be imposed directly on the Chinese economy in
the form of unnecessary transaction costs for Chinese companies
operating overseas. By this time, the experience with the definition of
"control" may well have made the authorities more responsive to
concerns about the costs of administration and compliance. Therefore,
although the phased implementation approach may not directly
hasten this change, it may help create the necessary conditions for
change.
Once China has gained experience in domestic merger analysis,
it will be better prepared to review transnational mergers in a way
that benefits the Chinese economy, both in terms of consumer welfare
and economic development, while still minimizing friction in the
global economy. After such experience, there will be substantially less
chance of China reaching different conclusions from those of Western
agencies on high-profile mergers, as the experience and confidence in
competition will likely bring Chinese analysis closer to international
norms both on matters of procedure and of substance. China will no
longer be tempted to "experiment" with applying untested
development considerations to cross-border mergers. This will reduce
the risk of international tension arising out of decisions like the
blocking of Coca-Cola's Huiyuan acquisition, a risk that would be
weightier in cases where the American company is an important
economic player and has a stronger desire to consummate the
merger. 210 In such cases, there is serious potential for tension like that
between the United States and European Union in the Boeing !
211
McDonnell Douglas and General Electric / Honeywell mergers.
C. Phased Implementation Can Help FurtherInternationalAntitrust
Convergence
As a consequence of this approach, any of the proposed
international antitrust convergence efforts outlined above in Part
II.A.3 would have a much greater chance of success, and China would
be much more receptive to such international efforts. Particularly with
regard to bilateral and multilateral arrangements, China could be
expected to become a valuable participant in international
convergence, sharing its experiences and applying the learning of

210. See Bauerlein & Fairclough, supra note 126 (observing that the acquisition may not
have been a good deal for Coke, as Huiyuan's sales and market share had been slipping at the
time of the failed acquisition).
211. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying discussion.
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others to its own enforcement mechanisms. China's increased trust in
competition to create prosperity and its comfort with a more dynamic
economy would enable it to listen more receptively to the advice of
foreign practitioners without reflexively doubting that the Western
approach could work in the Chinese context. At the same time, the
lessons learned in the laboratory of domestic Chinese antitrust could
be exported through these arrangements to help other developing
countries create and apply competition law in a way that is suited to
their unique needs.
Having devoted substantial effort to bringing China into the
fold of convergence on international antitrust, major players like the
United States and European Union would also be further convinced of
the value of convergence and would devote more energy to these
efforts, thus minimizing the risk of future merger-related conflict.
Having become more aware of the systemic risks that could arise from
antitrust review in countries like China, these players would recognize
the need to make a concerted effort to achieve true convergence, not
just lecture developing countries on how antitrust is done in the West.
If experience shows that economic development can legitimately be
part of antitrust merger analysis in developing countries without
adversely affecting consumers worldwide, Western governments will
be less perturbed when mergers involving Western firms are blocked
due to development concerns. Ultimately, a gradual start for China
beginning with review of domestic transactions would benefit every
party with a stake in international antitrust merger review.
V. CONCLUSION

In order to help ensure a smooth introduction to the world
antitrust arena, China should begin by gaining experience with
antitrust merger review at home. As the Chinese government gains
experience, it will develop trust in the fundamental concepts of
competition policy and develop its merger analysis to achieve China's
special goals without unnecessarily burdening international business.
When this happens, China will be ready to apply its AML to crossborder mergers in a manner that allays the concerns of Western
commentators and augments Chinese prosperity. In turn, this
application will contribute to an international competition community
where consumer interests are protected effectively and efficiently,
foreign investors feel secure in investing in China's developing
economy, and the risks of retaliatory protectionism are minimal. From
that point, it is reasonable to expect that China will become an active
participant in international convergence and norm creation efforts
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through fora like the ICN, while this experience will further convince
the rest of the antitrust community to push toward international
antitrust convergence. What had appeared initially to be a threat to
efficient international business combinations may ultimately lead to
an improved system of multi-jurisdictional merger review.
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